This pape r presents three s imple mathematical mode ls, all of game-theo retic type, d ea lin g with an inspector-inspectee relationship. The in s pectee alw ays tries to m ax imize hi s ne t gain, whic h is the amount he obtain s by "cheatin g" less the amount he is penalize d wh e n ca ught. Th e first mode l assumes a zero-sum payoff and so the in spector tries to minimize the in spectee's ne t ga in . [n th e second mod e l, the in s pec tor tries to deter c heat in g wit hout co nce rn fo r the ex tract ion of pe nalties.
Introduction
Thi s paper co ntain s the formulation and analys is of three simple mathe mati cal mod els, of gametheore tic type, oriented toward certain important aspects of the in spector-in spec tee relatio nship.
These models we re initially design ed in the co urse of a study perform ed for the NBS Offi ce of Weights and Measures, while seekin g tec hniques that mi ght be use ful to state " W&M" agenc ies in employing their reso urces to achieve best protection of co nsume rs against loss d Lte to malfun ctioning weighing and meas urin g devices used in re tail trade. However, they also appear releva nt to many other situation s involvin g an in spec tor-ins pec tee relationship in which it is mea nin gful to assign num erical values to the detection and to the nondetection of malfunc tion.
For example, food pac kaging pla nts (the in spec tees) are required to assure thro ugh self-polic in g that no more than a spec ified level of fore ign matte r (in the form either of less ex pe nsive s ubstitutes or of " dirt") e nters into the food they package . An agency of governme nt (the inspector) is c harged with guaranteeing to the public that these levels are not exceeded. If we can assign num e ri cal values to (1) the benefit accruing to the pac kage r (for exa mple, in reduce d operating expe nses) for permitting systematic violation of the maximal level of fore:gn matte r, and, (2) the pe nalty for bein g found in violation, then the models and analysis of thi s pape r mi ght well be pertinent. Similar comments can be made with "food purity" replaced by "consumer product safe ty . " The type of model at which we aim may also prove applicable to situations not c ustomarily described in terms of in spectors and inspectees. For exa mple, a de partm e nt store (the in spec tor) wishes to combat thie ve ry among its workforce (the in s pectees) and establishes an internal sec urity section with a fixed amount of resources. If numerical valu es can be specifi ed for successful and for unsuccessful stealing, the n model s lik e those of this pape r might be used to minimize the department store's lo ss. Many other scenarios can be formulated for which s uc h models co uld describe "optimal strategies" for both the inspector and the inspectee.
Although the sort of analysis initiated below promises to have b~oad scope, it should be stated at the outset that the present models are not detailed and highly realistic ones, capable of giving "practical answers." Rather, they are intended both as preliminary explorations of how certain
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issues might be framed for quantitative analys is, and as conc rete targets for c riticisms and sugge stions leading to superior versions.
The models ignore many features of the inspec tion process, for the sake of fo c using s harply and clearly on certain othe r features. Some of the ignored aspects will be explicitly identified late r, but for gene ral pers pective it should be noted th at our e mphasis he re is one-side dly on the "co nsumer protection" or " dete rrence of c heating" ele me nt in in spection operation s, as di stinguished fro m the "help the in spectee (merc hant) kee p IU s de vice acc urate" the me.
The features of the situation on wlUc h the models are inte nded to fo c us are the followin g:
(a) A commercial esta blishm ent, containin g one or more measuring de vices whic h " me te rs" its tran sactions with customers, has a n economic ince ntive to "c heat" in connectio n with that device. The ugly word "cheat" is used as a pithy abbreviation for any of (i) deliberately causing the device to malfunction in the direc tion economic ally advantageo us to the establishment (for example, "short weiglUng"), or (ii) knowingly permitting suc h a malfunction (originating through natural causes) to go un co rrected, or (iii) e mployin g s uc h a malfunctioning de vice, whi ch though not e xplicitly recognized as suc h, was not properly chec ked for malfunction. Diffe re nt esta bli shme nts, with different dollarflows of tran sactions, will experie nce economic incentives of differe nt magnitudes. The models contain a set of param ete rs (V;) re prese nting these magnitudes.
(b) The ins pection age ncy typically ha s onl y a limit ed qua ntity of " in spection reso urces" at its di sposal , a quantity likely to be too s mall for freque nt cove rage of all the devices in its jurisdiction. The models co ntain paramete rs, Tn and n, re prese nting respecti vely, the ins pection reso urces and the numbe r of devices over wlUc h they mu st be s pread.
(c) The detection of c heatin g lead s to impos ition of a " pe nalty" on the male fac tor. Thi s pe nalty might be the s um of (i) a monetary fin e, (ii) the dollar-equivale nt of interruption of the normal fl ow of business, a nd (iii) the economic loss due to dimini shed patronage following public disclos ure of the c heating. The models include a parame te r (P ) re prese ntin g the size of thi s pe nalty.
(d) Our purpose in this pa per is to begin the de velopm ent of additional methodological tools for designing more effective and effi cie nt responses by socie ty to the exi ste nce of cheating. Those res ponses include both a puniti ve e le me nt (whuse intensity is meas ured by P ) and a " polic ing" ele me nt (whose inte nsit y is re presented by Tn ) . By dete rmining how the leve l of illic it activity de pe nds on P a nd Tn , we hope to co ntribute to be tte r unde rsta nding of the effectiveness of the twoele me nt res pon se. By exhibiting the tradeoffs be tween P and Tn in the a bove de pe ndence, we hope to contribute to better understanding of the effi ciency with whic h that res ponse is allocate d be twee n the two ele me nts, though full ac hieve ment of tha t goal will also require models of t he "cost" (as well as the " pe rform ance output") associated with various co mbin ations of P and m. These partic ular objectives, whic h of co urse re main relevant in a broad context of regulatory and gene ral c riminaljustice activity, have g uided the development of the models to be described.
The mathe matical formulation of a first model is gi ve n in the next section (sec . 2), a nd is acco mpanied by a disc uss ion of some of that model' s shortcomin gs in orde r to ind icate directions fo r furthe r research. The results from analyzing this Modell are prese nted in section 3, along with two si mple ill ustrations; the analysis itself appears in section 4 (wlUc h the reader may prefer to omit). TlUs mode l makes the "zero-sum" ass umption-found in most ga me-theo retic literature-that the inspection agency's objecti ves are antithe tical to those of the "inspectee, " wlUc h implies in partic ul ar that the latter's loss through penalty-payment is the former's gain.
Section 5, in contrast, takes up a second model whic h is of nonzero-sum type; it treats the basic aim of the inspection activity as deterrence of cheating, with no separate value for the extraction of penalties after its detection. T he "solution" of this Model 2 is presented a nd illustrated , with the supporting analysis defe rred to section 6. In section 7 we d rop the usual game-theoretic assum ption that the playe rs select their strategies si multaneously (or, at least, that the strategy chose n by each player does not depend on the strategy c hose n by IUs oppone nt). Since the inspection procedure is an ongoing one, it would be expected that the inspectee, sooner or later , would be a ble to di sce rn the probabilistic pattern of the inspector's choices. Thus, in Model 3 we assume that when the inspectee formulates his strategy he knows what the inspector's strategy will be. Moreover the inspector is aware of this and so constructs his strategy with it in mind. The solution of Model 3 was suggested by NBS colleague L.S. Joel; the res ults for Model 3 are presented in section 7 while section 8 s upplies some of the longe r derivation s justifyin g these res ults.
Formulation of Model
Tlus mathematical model takes the form of a 2-player zero-sum game. The "playe rs" are the inspe ctor (an aggregate re prese ntin g the in s pec tion agency) and the inspectee (a n aggregate representing the establishments in whic h the measuring de vices are used) . The re is so me loss in reality through'regarding these establi s hme nts as forming a single player with a s ingle interest, but for the present model this potential turn s out not to be realized.
The inspectee can eithe r cheat, or not, for eac h of a se t of devi ces DbD2' .. . D". The inspector selec ts de vices for in spec tion , up to the limit of hi s reso urces. Detection of a c heat, if the device is inspected , is assumed certain. The data of the model are: n = numbe r of de vi ces, Vi = payoff to in spectee from c heatin g on D j, P = penalty again st in s pectee for eac h de tec tion of c heating, m = number of devices th e in spector ca n examin e (m < n ).
A strategy for the in spec tee is an n-compone nt vector in whi c h The co nsid eration of in s pec tee mixed st rategies (p ro bab ili sti c mixtures of ordin ary strategies) is not necessary for the prese nt model, i. e ., th e mode l ha s solut ion s whic h do not involve the m, but we will also prese nt those solutions wlu c h do incl ude mixed in s pec tee strategies.
A strategy for the insp ector is a spec ifi cation of a s ubset M of the se t N = {1 ,2, ... , n} s uc h that M has e xactl y m me mbers (notation: IMI = m). The interpre ta tion is that i EM if a nd onl y if Dj is inspected. It turn s out that co nsid e ration of mixed strategies for the in s pec tor is required in ord e r to solve the pre sent mode l. Initially we defin e suc h a mixed strategy to be a vec tor p , with a component p(M) for eac h s ubset M of N s uc h that IMI = m, and the properties that
The inte rpretation is give n by p (M) = Prob [{D j : i EM} are the devi ces in spected ).
With eac h such p ca n be associated the quantiti es
Clearly each Pi satisfies ° : : : : : ; p j :::::; 1. As will be prove d in section 4, the relation L Ii Pi = m holds. The net expected payoff to the inspectee, from device Vi , is the expected payoff from c heating minu s the expected penalty, i.e.
ViCi -P (Ci
Thus the total net ex pected payoff to the inspectee, if the two players choose respective mixed strategies c and p , is (2.4)
From the "zero-sum" assumption that the inte rests of the two players are diametrically opposed, it follows that -F(c,p) is the expected payoff to the in spector.
Before proceeding (in the next section) to prese nt the "solution" give n by this model-i. e., the "optimal strategies" for both players-we note some of the model's limitations and imperfections:
(a) The zero-sum assumption of diametrically opposed inte rests is not quite right unless one thinks of socie ty (whose agent is the inspector) as seeking vengeance rathe r than deterre nce. A second game-theoretic model, inte nded to give be tter ex pression to the " de terrence" the me, is formulated and analyzed in section 5.
(b) The "c heat or no-cheat" dichotom y is clea rl y a seve re idealization, ignoring as it does the possibility of introducing different degrees of bias into the dev ices (different amounts of cheating). To co nsi der this dim ens io n of the situation would also require formulatin g so m e mathematical represe ntation of how the probability of detec tion depends on the degree of cheating, and co uld raise interesting questions co ncernin g the role of the establi shm ents' c ustomers in performing part of the detec tion function (that of recogn izing gross cheating) . For the present we decline to explore these lines of ge neralization.
(c) Even with the above restriction, it see ms odd to assume that c heatin g will be de tected with certainty if the offen ding device is but in spected . This for example seems to rule out use of the model to examine the relative me rits of training, or selecting, or othe rwise e nco uraging ins pectors to work more rapidly (in effect, increasing m), versus stressing the thoroughness or quality of their work (in effect, increasing he probability of cheat-detection). Fortunately, this limitation is only formal; a detection probability 0 can be represe nted in the model simply by replacing the fixed penalty P, in (2.4), by the average pe nalty pi = Po.
(d) A quite natural extension of the model would be the replacement of P, in (2.4), by devicespecific pe nalties p;. (For example, the presence of site-depe ndent detection probabilities would lead, as above, to the use of POi in place of P. Also, interruption of business or loss of patronage could be more serious at sites with a greater volume of tran saction s, sugge sting the association of larger P;' s with large r V;'s.) This would raise no real problem were we co nte nt with solving the model num erically, but it does inte rfere with achieving the kind of nearly closed-form solution presented in the next section , and it definitely contradicts the desire to maintain in the model a simple clear-cut scalar quantity represe nting the inte nsity of society's sanction against c heating. So, this co mplication will be omitted from the present paper.
(e) If a serious level of cheating is detec ted, the inspector (go ve rnme nt) may reac t with measures which are onerous to all in spectees (merchants), even those with prope rly func tioning devices. Similarly, if detected c heating is publicized , honest as well as di shonest establishme nts may suffer from loss of public confide nce . These con siderations sugge st an inadequacy in the way (2.4) associates penalty specifically to those d evices at which cheating is discovered. P erhaps there should be a penalty P which is "activated" if c heatin g is discovered at any de vice (or at more than some "threshold" number of de vices). Thi s possibility is also left for future investigatio n; its in cl usion would preclude expressing the payoff function in te rms of the n p / s rather than the muc h mo re numerous p(M)'s.
(f) The inspector must decide whic h subse t of the n devices he will ins pect, a nd the fa mil y of subsets whic h re prese nt "allowable" outco mes of this dec ision are limited by the a mo unt of inspection resources available . In the present model, that limitation is expressed by specifyin g the number (m) of inspec tions whic h can be unde rtake n. This is clearly an idealization of the real-world situation in whi c h so me in spec tions may (pre dic tably) require more tim e th a n other s, so me inspection sites are re mote from the majority so that vi siting the m substantially redu ces the num ber of other de vices whic h ca n be in spec ted during a gi ve n tim e pe riod, etc. On e wo uld like to improve the model by incorporatin g a more realistic re presentation of the fa mily of "allowa ble" subsets fro m whic h the in spector can choose.
The precedin g li st suggests a numbe r of directions fo r furthe r analysis. But Modell a nd t he othe rs in thi s pa pe r, des pite their evide nt deficie ncies, are fe lt to re prese nt a s uita ble first step in foc usin g on the iss ues of inte rest.
Results for Model 1
In describin g the res ults for the model formulated above, it is co nve nie nt to mainta in the nota tion N = {1,2, . . . , n} , and also to e mploy the notat io ns T = {i : Vi > P }" f = N -T = {i: V; ::; P l. The le tte r "r ' was chosen beca use the devices {Di: i E T} are es pecially t e mpting c hoices for c heatin g.
The solution takes diffe re nt form s according as (Case 1) (3.2) or its opposite
hold s. If the Vi are thought of as fixed, the n this divi sion into cases can be construed as part itioning the first quadrant of (P,m)-s pace into two regio ns. The Case I region corres pond s (as will be see n) to situations where the in s pectee's optimal strategy is to c heat on all devices, a nd so thjs region may be inte rpreted as re presenting grossly inadequate societal respo nses to the threat of c heatin g. For each of the two cases, we will prese nt a strategy C O for the in s pec tee, a mixed strategy pO for the inspector, and a number FO, s uc h that
for all c. FO = F(cO,pO) as the measure of average illicit ne t gains "predicted" by the model. This is the customary solution concept for zero-sum two-player games.
[A technical note to avoid a possible source of confusion: it can be proven from (3.4) and (3.5) that Thus the value can be defined without reference to any particular CO and pO. With this done, condition (3.4) defines the notion of an optimal strategy CO without reference to any pO, while (3.5) defines the notion of an optimal strategy pO without reference to any co. Such definitions are in general possible only for zero-sum two-player games.] For Case I, as already stated, the optimal strategy for the inspectee is to cheat on all devices; formally , CO is given by C? = 1 for all i. Any mixed strategy pO for the inspector is optimal if it satisfie s the " no overkill" condition for all i E T. (3.8) The value is given by P=2:rV; In Case II, it is convenient to partition T as E U U, where (3.10) the symbols were chosen as the first letters of "equal" and " untempting." If strict inequality holds in (3.3), then the optimal strategies for the inspectee involve cheating on the tempting devices , but not on the untempting ones, i.e. ,
12)
The phrasing of (3.13) was chosen to be co mpatible with the admission of mixed strategies for the inspectee (i.e., "0 :::; Ci :::; 1" rather than "Ci = 0 or I "). In the special case that equality holds in (3.3), there is an additional family of optimal strategies obtained by choosing a number C with 0 < C :::; 1 and (with (3.11) retained) re placing (3. 12-3.13) with
The optimal strategies for the in s pec tor req uire alway s in specting the te mpting de vices and avoiding " underkill" on the othe rs, i.e.,
for i E f (3. 14) which implies p? = 1 for i E E. 
(3.17)
If P < V the n I TI = n , so tha t (s ince we ass um e m < n ) the de finin g co ndition of (3 .16) holds and he nce (3. 16) rathe r tha n (3. 17) is t he case. II V :s P the n I TI = 0, so tha t e ithe r (3. ]6) o r (3 . 17) hold s de pend in g o n whe ther or not P < nV/ m. O ur ma in interest is not in the optimal strategies bu t rathe r in th e depe nd e nce of the "ne t illi c it ga in " FO , a meas ure o f (impe rfect) perfo rm a nce by the in specti on syste m, as a fun c tion of P and m. T h is depe nde nce is s umma ri zed in fi gure 1, in whic h FO is co ntinuo ll s across the c urve (an eq ujlatera l hype rbo la) separa tin g the two regions s how n. T he
Ne t illicit gain (equal -sized /i n ns).
EXAMPLE 2: Big Firms, Small Firms. Here there are nb "big firms" each with 11; = ~, and n. 
Analysis for Model 1
This section contains the mathematical justification of the res ults prese nted in section 3. Readers preferring to do so can go directly to section 5 without loss of continuity .
A first technical point to be settled is the permissability of passing from the original definition of a mixed strategy for the inspector, namely that of a vector with co mpone nts p (M) satisfying (2.1)-where M ranges over all subsets of N with IMI = m-to the subseque nt de finition as a vector p with components Pi satisfying (2 .3). It will first be shown that each collection {P(M )} obeying (2.1) leads via (2.2) to a set of Pi obeying (2.3); the n it will be prove d that eac h s uc h p = (Pi) arises fro m suc h a collection {P(M)}.
For the first purpose, conside r any collec tion {P (M) } obeying (2.1), and le t ai = 1 [or all i EN .
With Pi defined by (2.2), we clearly have Pi ~ 0 as well as For the second purpose define, for each subset Q of N for which IQI = m , a vector 1TQ whose compone nts are given by
Note that the 1TQ are the ve ltices of the set (hypercube) 5* co nsisting of vec tors 1T with components p(M) satisfying (2 .1). Next, for each subset Q of N for which IQ I = m, define a vector pQ with components given by
The set 5, of all vectors p with components Pi satisfying (2.3), is the intersection of a hypercube with a hyperplane; its vertices must be the intersections of the hyperplane with the edges or vertices of the hypercube, from which it readily follows that the vertices of 5 are precisely the vectors Pa. To prove that the strategies presented in section 3 are indeed optimal, it is convenient to set
and to work, not with the payoff function F of (2.4), but rather with
Note that
We turn first to Case I, which according to (3.2) is characterized by
Using (3.9), we set
Following (3.7), let CO be defined by c? = I for all i. Then by (2.3) and (4.2)
for all mixed strategies p for the in spector.
Next, consider any mixed strategy pO such thatp? :5 Vi for all i E T. Then, since pO :5 1 < Vi for all i E T, it follows that for all c, Such mixed strategies po do ex ist, for if m :5 I {Vi: i E f} they can be chosen with p? = 0 for all i E T, while if
then (4.4) assures the existence of some with p? = Vi for all i E f.
The preceding material shows that (cO,pO,fO) give optimal strategies and the value for the game with payoff function f, so that (cO,po,F,,) give the corresponding information for the original game. Moreover, the indicated optimal strategies are the only ones. To see thi s, note first th~t the strictness of the inequality in (4.4) permits a choice of po in (4.6) for whic h p? < Vi for all i E T, and the n equality will hold in (4.6) only for c = cO. (A se parate but easy argument is needed if f is e mpty.) Next, if p is any mixed strategy fo r which
is non e mpty, the n define c by Ci = 0 for i E I, and Ci = 1 for all i EN-I,. One obtains
and the ex iste nce of a c with this prope rty ruJes out the optimality of p.
Next we present the analys is for Case II , whic h according to (3.3) is c haracte rized by
Using (3.12), we put With CO defined by (3.11-3.13) ,
for all p. On the other hand, for pO satisfying (3.14), i. for all c. So (CO,p0,f0) form an optimal solution. The existence of mixed strategies pO obeying (4.10) is assured by (4.7).
Once again, there are no other optimal inspector strategies. To see this, note first that equality holds in (4.9) only if
which will therefore be assumed in the balance of this paragraph. If
is nonempty then one can define c by
yielding which shows that p is not optimal. Next we inquire whether there are other optimal inspectee strategies; mixed strategies (0 ::s; Ci ::s; 1) are admitted in the discussion. Nite first that equality holds in (4.11) only if
which is therefore assumed in the balance of this paragraph. Suppose that
is nonempty; we will attempt to deduce from this that c is not optimal. If strict inequality holds in (4.7), one can choose p to satisfy (4.10) with P k > Vk for all k E K; thus so that c is not optimal. Now assume (4.7) holds with equality. If there exist distinct k E K and i E E U U with Ci < Ck> then choose any positive 0 with and define p by
Then p is a mixed strategy, and
showing that c is not optimal. The only remaining possibility is that equality holds in (4.7) and, for some C with 0 < c :5 1,
fori EE.
In this situation, for any p,
s howing that c is indeed o ptimal.
( 4. 12)
One furthe r techni cal questi on is whe the r the use of mixed s tra tegies fo r the in s pector is really necessary. Mig ht no t the in s pector ha ve " unmixe d" (o r " pure") s tra tegies whic h a re optimaJ ? S uc h a s trategy pO, besides obeying (2.3), wo uld also sa ti sfy p? = 0 o r 1 fo r a ll i EN. In Case II, we see fro m (4. 10) that thi s wo uld require all p? = 1, so that (2.3) would be sati s fI ed o nly in the uninte resting case m = n. Fo r Ca se I, ass umin g no Vi exac tl y equaJ to 1, (4. 12) a nd the condition p? :5 Vi fo r all i E f impl y tha t p? = 0 for all i E f , so tha t (2.3) can be sati sfi e d if a nd o nl y if I TI 2= m , a condition whic h does not follow from the definin g c h arac teri sti c (4.4) of Case 1. So mixed strategies are indeed needed in Case II, and also in Case I whe n ITI < m.
Formulation and Results for Model 2
In what follow s, the payoff func tion for the ins pectee is as befo re in (2.4), name ly F(c,p) = I;' [V; -Pp;] c ;.
We now regard the in spector's aim , howe ve r, a s tha t of minimizing the totaJ loss (e .g. , to cons um e rs) as a result of c heating. The payoff function for the in spector is the refore take n initially to be G(c,p) = -I;' V;c;,
rather than the previous -F(c,p).
The solution concept typically employed for such nonzero-sum (and "noncooperative") games is that of an equilibrium point (EP), namely a pair (CO,pOj of strategies such that for all c, (5 .3) for all p.
Such a pair has the "stability" property that if both players adopt them, then neither has in ce ntive for a unilateral change in his strategy. This approach is not helpful in the prese nt situation, since any strategy pO for the inspector is part of some EP, (CO,pO). To show this, one need merely choose CO to maximize F(c,p,,) ; then (5.3) is obeyed, and since G(c,p) depends only on its first argument, (5.4) is also satisfied . Thus, the formulation provides no guidance for the inspector.
Two methods for escaping this unsatisfactory state of affairs have been considered. One of them, which involves abandonment of a strictly game-theoretic approach, is discussed in sections_7 and 8. The other ("Model 2"), to be treated in this section and the next one, introduc es a slightly different objective for the inspector, namely to minimize the total loss due to undetected c heating.
-.
( 5.5) A rationale for this objective-reasonable, but in the writers' opinion less than compelling----can be given in terms of a scenario in whic h society's response to c heating is so struc tured that the pe nalty for a second offense is prohibitive to the inspectee. (Thus, P now represents the penalty for a first (detected) offense.) For such a scenario, it is plausible that future c heating would occur precisely at the sites of current undetected cheating, so that its exte nt is measured by (5.5).
We now proceed to describe the eq uilibrium points (CO,pO) of the game with payoff functions (5.1) and (5.5); the analysis supporting these results is given in section 6. The associated payoff values, FO = F(cO,p") and GO = G(CO,pO), will also be presented .
The devices may be assumed numbered so that
The presence of ties among the Vi'S can make this numbering somewhat arbitrary, and will lead to some complications (technical rather than substantive) in describing the solution of the model. In addition to the sets
defined earlier, it is conve nient to define the sets
The three sets Ni", N-;;. and N'/n partition N; either or both of the first two might be empty, but N'/n contains at least the member m . The disc ussion of Model 2, like that of Modell, splits into cases. First assume (Case l).
(5. 8)
As in Case I of Model 1, all equilibrium points (CO,p,,) for this case involve che ating on all devices, I.e., c? = 1 for all i.
(5 .9)
The strategie pO involve alway in pec ting ' those de vices more te mpting than the mth, and ne ver inspec ting those less te mpting, i. e ., toge ther with a " floor" under the freq ue ncy of c heating on the ot her de vices:
The inspec tion policies are give n by 
(Case IlIA)
A second and more complicated type of equilibrium point exists when
For its description, let The associated payoffs are given by for i E T,
(5. then c::' \In has as range of variation the interval (n,+l ,V~) determined by (5.39), so that GO as given by (5.52) has a corresponding range of variation. This illustrates the general theoretical possibility, in a nonzero sum game, for different equilibrium points (i.e., "solutions") to have different associated payoff levels. The present model exhibits this phenomenon only for the particular "coi ncidence" described by (5.53).
It should also· be observed that Cases lIlA and IIlB may coexist, giving rise to different equilibrium points. This occurs precisely when (5.54) which in the context of Case IIIB implies that a = {3, (5.55) so that the above-mentioned non uniqueness of GO occurs.
The general results presented above will now be illustrated using the same two special scenarios employed for Model 1, namely the "equal-sized firms" case (all Vi = V) and the "big firms, small firms" scenario (Vi = Vb for 1 :::; i :::; nO. Vi = V. for nb < i :::; nb + ns = n, Vb > V s). The dependence of GO on P and m is summarized in figure 3 ; the dependence of FO is given by the earlier figure 1. Note, in figure 3 , that GO is not continuous across the hyperbola Pm = V;ot; as shown by (5.60), it is not single-valued on this curve, and its range of variation at each point of the curve is precisely the interval between its limits as the curve is approached from within each of the two regions identified in the figure. In the lower region, GO does not depend on P; this can be interpreted a.s a situation of "penalty saturation," in which stiffer penalties yield no improvement unless accompanied by greater inspection resources. 
Undetected illicit activity (big finns , small firms).

Analysis for Model 2
P
Pm =Vtot
Pm = Vbnb
The aim in this section is to prove the results cited In section 5, I.e., to dete rmine the equilibrium points (CO,p,,) of the game with payoff function s V;c;(l -p;) . Conversely, any (CO,pO) which satisfies (6.9-6.13) also satisfies (6.3) through (6.5), and so is an equilibrium point. This completes the analysis of Case I. Finally, observe that (6.51) and (6.64) will hold simultaneously if and only if the former holds as an equality while the latter' s second part holds as an equality with C\' = f3.
Formulation and Results for Model 3
Recall that section 5 originally set out to analyze the consequences of the payoff fun ctions
for inspectee and inspector respectively, but that this was found unfruitful within the framework of "equilibrium point" solutions to nonzero-sum games. The response in section 5 was to replace (7.2) with an alternative function (5.5) representing the loss (e.g., to consumers) due to undetected cheating (rather than all cheating) . In this section we explore a different approach, in which (7.2) is retained but the customary game-theoretic framework is altered. Specifically, the critical assumption here is that no matter what strategy p is selected by the inspector, the inspectee learns of it in advance (or can estimate it through experience), and so is able to select a strategy c(p) which maximizes his payoff, i. e.,
F[c(p),p] = max c F(c,p). (7.3)
(In general p is a mixed strategy, so that the inspectee need not know exactly which devices will be inspected but only the associated probabilities.) The inspector's problem, therefore, is to c hoose p so as to maximize the function
To discuss this approach further, It IS convenient to make the further hypothesis that each component of c(p) depends only on the corresponding component of p , so that we can write C i(P i) rather than Ci(P). This hypothesis is reasonable per se (since the inspectee's c/s are not linked by any constraints), and also is consistent with the consequences Ci(Pi) = 0 if Pi > V;!P, (7 .5) if Pi < V;!P (7.6) of (7.1) and (7.3).
In term's of the set 2
we can identify a set of components of c(p ), namely {Ci(P ;): i E E(p)} , which are not determined by the criterion (7. 3) . That is, c(p) is not single-valued, a nd so the same is true of the inspector's objective func tion (7. 8) Some furthe r ass umption is needed to resolve this ambiguity. For exam ple, since our critical ass umption (that the inspectee knows p) is "pessimi stic" fro m the in s pector's viewpoint, one might wish to be consistently pess imi stic and thus to re place the right-ha nd side of (7.4) by its minimum ove r all c( p) consiste nt with (7 .3). T hi s is equi vale nt to settin g
At the opposite ex tre me, one mi ght wa nt to introduce a co untervailin g bi as 111 the optimistic direction, and so wo uld set
( 7.9) Thi s is the c hoice that will for the prese nt be made. It in volves a notion of " no c heating wi thout a positive ex pec tation of gain," whic h is not im pla usible but certainly in volves appeal to co nsid e ra tions that are externaJ to the model (a nd that, in pa rtic ula r, go beyond the pe nalty P a nd its dete rre nt effect). After the conseq ue nces of hypothesis (7.9) have been a nalyzed, we will co nsider the more general situa tio n in whic h thi s ass um ption is not im posed.
Retaining the no tation
for subsets I of N, and set
The n H (p ) depe nds on p only via I(p ), since by (7.5), (7.6), (7.8) and (7.9),
'--Note that I(p) corresponds to -the set of device s· on which c heating will not occur, according to (7.5) and (7.9). From (7.11) it follows that the in spector' s problem can be written c hoose p to maximize V[I(p) ]. (7.12) In this context, it is natural to ask whic h subsets I of N can arise in the form I(p) for so me p , i.e., as the " non-c heating" set for some strategy of the inspector. A>; will be shown in section 8, a set of conditions on a subset I which are both necessary and sufficient that I = I (p) for some p , are
( 7. 15) For a s ubset I of N whic h obeys these three conditions, there may be man y c hoices of p for whic h
, one s uc h p is give n by
Pi = 1 for i E I u T P i = [V;
(m -I II -I T I)]IV(N -1 -T ) fori EN -1 -T.
If II I :s: m :s: II I + I Tj, then suc h a p is give n by
If II I > m the n suc h a p is give n by
fo r i EN -1.
( 7. 16) (7.1 7) (7 .18) (7.19) (Whe n Pili -V(I) = 0 then V; = P for all i E I and we inte rpret (7.18) as P i = 1. ) This will be proved in section 8.
The inspector's proble m can now be re phrased as that of c hoosing a subset I of N, subject to (7.13) through (7.15), to (7. 20) Whe n suc h an I has been found , an optimal p can be calculated through (7. 16), (7. 17) or (7.18-7.19 ).
For the maximization problem, (7.15) a nd (7.16) are, in fact , unnecessary, that is, if 1 maximizes V(I) s ubj ect to (7.13) and (7.1 4) then III + I TI 2:: m , so that (7.16) does not arise, and I satisfi es ( 7.1 5 s ubject to the analogs of (7. 13) and (7. 14):
for iET. Proble m (7.21}-(7.23) c annot in ge ne ral be so lve d in clo sed form. As a (b inary) integer program , it can (if n is not too large) be solved by any of the methods de veloped for s uc h proble ms. More pec ificaUy, it is a " knapsac k proble m," fo r whi c h special algo rithm s a re available. 3 Its pec uli arity as a knapsack proble m, nam e ly the prese nce of the sa me coeffi c ie nts (V;) in both (7.21) and (7.22), suggest the possibility of mo re e ffic ie nt " tailore d" me thods, but thi s will not be purs ue d he re.
EXAM PLE 1: Equal-Sized Firms. As before, we ass um e in thi s sce nario that all V; = V. If P < V, the n T is aU of N, so that (7.14) impues I is e mpty. Thus (7. 17) appues, giving
for all i, and the associated payoffs are FO = 11;", -Pnl, (7.24) GO = -11;",. (7.25) This case corresponds to weak social sanctions, resulting in c heating on every de vice.
If P 2:: V, then T is empty and the problem is that of choosing I to maximize III subject to . (7.26) To describe the solution in thi s case, let k be the largest integer not exceeding eithe r Pm/V or n, and let I be any subset of N with III = k. Since n > m and P 2:: V, it follow s that k 2:: m, so (7.18-7.19) applies to yield
The associated inspec tee strategy is
and the resultant payoffs are
( 7.27) See figure 5 for a depiction of the payoffs a fun ctions of P and m. FO is continuous along the line P = V, whereas GO has a discontinuity across that line. To the right of this line, P and GO are both discontinuous across each hyperbola Pm = tV for integers t ::::; n, since the integer parameter k changes value there. In case ns ::; m, we take I = 5. This is clearly the largest possible subset of 5, and it satisfies (7.29) since ns ::; m and V. ::; P. From (7.17)
-----------
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. Net illicit gain (FO) and total illicit-activity level ( -GO
and by (7.5) and (7.9), Ci = 0 for all i E 5. The res uJtant payoffs are , and ns > m, it follows that k 2: m, and so (7.18-7.19 ) applies to yield
Since m/k 2: VIP, it then follows from (7.5) and (7.9) that Ci = 0 for i E I, while by (7.6), Ci = 1 for i E 5 -I. The corresponding payoffs are If Pm ~ V"'t then the optimal I is all of N (i. e ., Xb = nb and Xs = n s), so that all Ci = 0, implying FO = Co = 0, while (7.18) gives, for all i,
Now assume Pm < Y;ot. No closed-form answer to (7.32-7.34) seems possible, but trial-anderror solution methods should suffice. The maximum value Z max in (7.32) can be estimated by Pm -Vb < Z max ::; Pm ; (7.35) here the right-hand inequality follows from (7.34), while the left-hand one follows by observing that if Figure 6 shows the payoffs FO and Co as functions of P and m. This concludes the di sc ussion of Example 2 in the context of Model 3.
It remains to discuss the consequences of droppin g assumption (7.9). For this purpose, we introduce the numbers C{ = C i(V;/P ), (7 . 39) which necessarily satisfy ° : : ; C{ ::; 1, and also set (7.40) In practice, it is unlikely that the crs (i.e., the probabilities of c heating at the various devices in a context of zero expected gain) would be known accurately. They might be assigned nominal high, medium or low values (such as 0.90, 0. 50, and 0.10) in accordance with the insight or degree of optimi sm applicable to a specific application. They might well be assumed equal over all devices, or over each group of devices in a classification into a very few groups ; these common values could the n be varied in a parametric sensitivity analysis. At any rate, these numbe rs are treated as "given" in what follows. ( -C o) .
Ln additio n to the set E( p ) de fin ed in (7. 7), it is co nve nie nt to de fin e furth er sets 42) so th at M( p ), E (p ) and L (p ) form a partition of N. By (7.5) a nd (7.6),
while by (7.39)
( 7.44)
It follows that
( 7.45)
The me mbe rs of the set E (p ) Ii N + co nstitute the "violatio ns" of the prev ious ass umption (7.9).
At thi s po int, we te mporaril y restric t attention to the special case in whic h the set E of (3.10) is e mpty, i.e., no Vi is exac tly equal to P. The n for i E E (p ), we have Pi < 1. In this case, as will be s hown in section 8, s uc h violations ca nnot occ ur for an optimal p unless the two condition s M(p ) is e mpty, (7.46) .47) both hold. If they do hold, then
{V;lP
Thus violations of (7.9) can only occur for an optimal p if the problem's data present the "coincidence" that some subset of the ~'s, specifically {~: i E E(p)}, sums exactly to Pm. In all other cases, the assumption (7.9) does not alter the problem of finding an optimal p. To describe how the exceptional cases just defined can be treated (and identified), define an inspector's strategy p to be exceptional if it satisfies (7.46) and (7.47), which as already seen, implies
( 7.48) Since i E E(p) implies ViP = Pi::; 1, it also follows that E(p) c;;; f = N -T. Conversely, if E* is any subset of N such that V(E*) = Pm, E* c;;; f, (7.50) then E* = E(p) for one (in fact, precisely one) exceptional p, namely the one defined by Pi = ~/P for i E E* and all other Pi = O. For exceptional p ' s, (7.45) becomes
so that the problem of selecting a "best" exceptional p is equivalent to that of choosing a subset E* of N to minimize 2: {~c/: i E E*} subject to (7.50). This can be written as a binary integer program in terms of variables namely subject to { I ifi EE*,
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(7.51) (7.52) (7.53) (7.54)
As noted already, the preceding analysis leads (in partic ular) to those optimal p's which exhibit violations, i. e., for whic h E(p) n N + is none mpty. But it may be that no optimal p is of this type, and in any case the restriction to thi s type may unduly limit the varie ty of alternate optima found.
Therefore, still assuming that E is empty, we consider how to find optimal p which are violationfree . For any s uc h p , the first summand on the right side of (7 .45) is ze ro , and since L(p) and I(p) are compleme ntary subsets of N, the problem beco mes that of c hoosin g violation-free p to maximize V[l(p) ]. This leads, as below (7. 12), to the pro ble m of choosin g a s ubset I of N so as to maximize V(I) subject to (7. 13) through (7.15). As noted below (7.20), (7.15) is superfluous for this purpose and (7.16) does not arise.
Suppose that III::; m ::; III + ITI. Then, by (7.17) , no i d can lie in E (p ). Also, no i E T can lie in E(p) since Pi ::; 1 is required. If som e i EN -I -T lay in E (p ) then Vi = 0, sin ce Pi = ° by (7.17). Thus p is violation-free.
Next, suppose such an optimizing I satisfies III > m. Since the emptiness of E implies 1 -V;IP oF 0, the p given by (7.18-7. 19 ) has E(p ) empty and he nce is violation-free, except if V(l ) = Pm (i.e., if equality holds in (7.13)). So if V(l ) < Pm , the n a comparison of H( p) as give n by (7.11) with the "exceptional-strategy maximum" of H will ide ntify the optimum.
Finally, s uppose the maximum value of V(l ) is Pm . (A higher value is forbidde n by (7.1 3).) For any I ac hieving this value , and any p for whic h I ( p ) = I , we have (sin ce V; ::
a nd since the end term s in (7.55) are equal, equality mu st hold thro ughout , implying that p is give n by
56)
Thi s p is exceptional, a nd will exhibit violations unless I n N + is e mpty (for example, violations will occ ur if all ci > 0). If I n N + is none mpty for all I obeying (7. 13-7.15 ) and yielding V(l ) = Pm , then finding a best violation-free p is not constrained by sharpe ning (7 .13) to (7.13 ') In this case, for any I maximizing V(l) , it follows as before that the p given by (7.16), (7:1 7) or (7.18-7.19 ) is violation-free and hence is a be st violation-free strategy for the inspector.
In the context of the last paragraph, it is necessary to check whether the constraint (7. 15) ca n s till be omitted in maximizing V(l ). If Pm < Ve T) the n the justifying argume nt given below (7.20) remains valid. The same is true when Pm ;::::: VeT), except if Ve T) = V(U) = Pm. In thi s case (7.13) will be re placed by (7.1 3') and the solutions will be all sets I = T -{j} , where j is suc h that ~ = min {V;: i E T}. Since Pm = VeT), (7.1 5) is equivalent to V(/ ) < Pili + Pin whic h is tru e whe n III oF 0 (since I <;::; T) and is also true whe n III = ° (since ITI > 0).
EXAMPLE I':
Equal-Sized Firms . He re we illustrate the preceding material. The sce nario (all V; = V) treated in Example 1 of thi s section is retained. Howe ver, the ass umption (7.9) is no longer retained. It is assumed that E is e mpty, i.e., V i= P. " Violations" of (7.9) can occ ur only if Pm = kV for some integer k with k ::; n. When no such k exists, the analysis of Example 1 re mains valid.
For the present example, we therefore assume that Pm = kV whe re k is an integer with k ::; n.
It is also necessary to s pecify the numbers ci of (7.39). Now a best violation-free strategy, pF, will be determined. The problem of maximizing V(I) , subject to (7.13-7.14), has as solutions all subsets I of N with
There are two subcases. If I can be chosen disjoint from N +, w hjch is true if and only if Ck = 0 in (7.58), then in particular I can be taken as the set E* given above; here pI-; is violation-free , can be taken as pF, and so is optimal. But if ci; > 0, then (7.13) must be replaced by (7.13') in the maximization of V (l). This problem has as so lution any subset I of N with III = k -1 (note that
for i E 1, p t = 0 othelwise . Equation (7.11) yields
(7.60)
When Ck > 0, (7.59) and (7.60) must be compared to determine the optimum. If I1 c; 2: 1, then H(pt) :::; H(pF) and so p P is optimal. If It c1 :::; 1, then H(pc) 2: H(pF) and pE is optimal.
This co ncludes the discussion of Example I'. To complete trus discussion of Model 3, we must consider the consequences of removing the restriction, introduced shortly below (7.45), that E is empty. Denote by P* the problem of c hoosing an inspector's strategy p to minimize the expression (7.45). For each integer k in the range 0 :::; k :::; min {lEI, m} , let Pk be the problem obtained from P* by adjoining the constraints
If pk denotes an opt imal solution to Pk, and K is such that (7.62) then clearly pK is an optimal solution to P*. Thu s it suffices to be able to solve the problems P k .
For each k, let Ek be a subset of E suc h that lEI = k and I {cr: I EE k} is minimum. In other words, this sum co nsists of the k smallest me mbers of {cr: i E E}; ties can be broken arbitrarily. It will be shown in section 8 that Pk has an optimal solution for wruch
Thu s the analy sis o f Pk can be co nfin ed to s uc h strategies. Beca use m < n , (7.64) gives i E L (p ), a nd so (7.45) yield s
Ther e fore the problem Pk beco mes that of c hoos ing the nonnegati ve qu antIt les {pj : i E N -E}, whic h by (7.63) and (7.64) must sum to min {m -k, n -lE I}' so as to minimi ze the s um of the first two s ummands in (7.65). Thi s proble m, howe ve r, is of the type treated ea rlie r (no V; = P), with N re place d by N -E and m by min {rn -k, n -lE I}' a nd in that se nse 4 ca n be regarde d as " already
It wiJJ also be s hown in sec tion 8 that the ra nge of k , for proble ms Ph" to be trea ted as indica te d a bove, can be co ntrac ted. T o de fin e the re duce d ran ge, le t U = {i : V; < P} as be fore, a nd se t
Let r be the greatest intege r not exceed ing p, a nd s the s mallest int ege r greate r tha n a. If s 2:: min {lE I, m }, se t I equ al to thi s minimum ; othe rwise, se t l equ a l to th e grea test integer be twee n sa nd min {lEI, m} incl us ive for whic h 2: {cf : i E E[ -Es } < 1, with tie-brea kings in the c hoices of El -E s pe rfo rmed so th at the latte r is a subse t of the former. The n the proble ms Pk need be solve d onl y ove r the ra nge max {a, r} :s k :s I .
No loss of alte rn ati ve o ptima is inc urre d by im posin g the up pe r limit ; the sa me is true of the lowe r limit , whe n Vi : i E E} ha s as ma ny as r me mbe rs < l.
EXAMPLE 1": Equal-Sized Firms . We ca n now co mple te the d isc ussion of thi s sce nari o, for Mode l 3 without assumption (7 .9), by cove ring the case excl uded in the previous Example I ': tha t of all V; = P. As before, we ass um e the numbe ring is s uc h that o :s ci :s ct :s .. . :s c;, :s 1, and can the refore take E k = {l, 2, .. . , k} . Sin ce E = N, the first two te rm s on the ri ght-ha nd side of (7 .65) are zero, yielding
as the optim al valu e (call it H J fo r pro ble m Pk . Beca use the value K in (7 .62) ca n be take n he re to be K = m. Thus an optimal strategy for the ins pector is given, by (7.63) and (7.64), as Pi = 1 Pi = 0 and the optimum insjJector's payoff is for 1 ::; i ::; m, form < i::; n,
consistent with the result (7.59) for Example I'.
In order to illustrate the various types of optimal strategies which can occur, we will close this section with a numerical example.
EXAMPLE 3: Let n = 5, m = 2, P = 1, and Thus T is empty, E = {1,2}, and V(U) = 1.3. Also, p = -0.3 and r = -1, so that the lower limit in (7.66) does not ease the analysis. Without loss of generality, we can assume ci ::; c~ and c~ ::; ct. We have (]" = 0.7 and s = 1, so that if c~ = 1 then I = 1 and so (7.66) would excuse us from analyzing problem P2• The problems Pk (k = 0,1,2) will be considered separately .
For P2 we have E2 = {1, 2}. By (7.63 
Combining these, we get the unique optimal solution to g. By (7.65), -H2 = 1.3 + ci + cr (7.67) For PI we can take EI = According to (7.21) Since the maximum achieves equality in (7.69), if e~ > 0 then (7.13) is to be replaced by (7.13'), i.e ., This yields alternate solution s I = {3,4} and I = {3,5}; the first of the m gives, by (7 .18--7.19 ), p~'=.5/ 12 , p~'= 7Il2, p~= O .
By (7.6.5),
-Ht' = 1. 5 + ej. Finally, corresponding to problem Po we have the empty set Eo. By (7.64) ,
The reduction of Po to {D3, D4, D5} has n' = 3 and m' = 2. Since no subset of {V3, V4, V:;} s ums to Pm', we need only find the best violation-free strategy for thi s reduced proble m. Thi s lead s to I = {3, 4, 5}, and by (7.18--7.19 ),
By (7.65),
-Ho = 2. (7.71) The maximum value Hm ax of H, corresponding to the optimal in spector's strategy, is given by -Hm ax = min {-H2' -Hf, -HL -Ho} (7.72)
Note that the value of d is irrelevant. In table 3, it is shown that each of the four possible optimal strategies described above, and correspondingly each of the four candidate expressions for the minimum in (7.72), can yield the optim urn for some choices of {cr, c~, c~, C~5}' In each row of the table, the optimal value of H is marked with an asterisk. 
Verifications for Model 3
Prob le m Po
In this section we present proofs of several assertions made during the analysis of Model 3 in section 7.
For the first of these, recall from (7.10) the definition
We are to show that a sub set I of N has the form I(p) , for at least one p , if and only if 1 satisfies the three co nditions
For the proof of sufficiency, suppose 1 obeys (8.2-8.4). If III + ITI < m then, following (7.16),
Since m < n and all 1-' ; > 0, the denominator in (8.6) is strictly positive. It is clear that all P i ~ 0, and it follow s from (8.4) and ( 8.6) Thus (8..'"r8.6 ) indeed define a proper p . It follows from (8.3) and (8.5) that i E I implies i E I(p). It follows from (8.6) and (8.4) that i EN -
Ifl/l :s m:S II I + In the n followin g (7. 17), set
The de nomin a tor of (8.8) ca n be nonpos itive onl y whe n T is e mpty. Clearly 0 :s Pi :s 1 for alJ i.
Also, ~;' Pi = m. Thu s, ) de fin e a proper p. Clearl y (8.7) impli es that i E I ( p ) fo r al l i E I and , if i EN -I, the n ( 8.&--8.9 ) imply that i EN -I (p ). So / = 1(P), as desired.
If III > m the n, followin g (7. 1&--7.19) , set As above, this would lead to a contradiction of the optimality of p, so (8.14) must hold.
It remains to verify the assertions made in the final part of section 7, that following the discussion of Example I'. Recall that P* is the problem of choosing an inspector's strategy p to mInImIze -H(p) = 2: {V;ct: = 2: {V;ct: The first of these assertions is that P k has an optimal solution in which E(p) II E = E k, where
Ek is any particular solution to the problem of finding a subset E' of E which minimizes 2: {c;: i E E'} subject to IE'I = k. In fact, the following argument will show that every optimal solution p of P k is such that E(p) II E is a solution of the last-mentioned problem, which we denote (hFor the proof, assume p is an optimal solution of P k for which E(p) II E 4= E k . Since these two sets each have k members, it follows that 0 < k < lEI and that there exist indices Pk• Thus equality must hold, and so q is also optimal for Pk ; repetition of thi s step will clearly lead to an optimal strategy 1T' for P k such that E( 1T') (I E = E k, as desired.
We are now assured that Pk has an optimal strategy p such that 
is to be realized as L {Pi: i E E -E k}, subjec t to (8.17). The simplest suc h allocation of this residual is the uniform one, leading to (7.63) and (7.64); alternative allocations lead to alternative optimal solutions to P k. For the verification of (7.66), first observe that proble m P k has bee n red uced to that of c hoosing the probabilities {Pi: i EN -E = V u T} , s umming to min {m -k, IV u TIL so as to minimize the fun ction given by (7.65), namely 
(8.19)
Thus solving P k is equivalent to c hoosing the probabilities {Pi: i E U } , s umming to min {m -k, I U I}, so as to minimize the sum of the first two s ummands on the right-hand side in (8.19). The pro babilities {p j: i E T} can be c hosen arbitrarily, e xce pt that they must s um to min {m - It will be s ho wn be low that H k < H s' Thi s implies the second ine quality of (7.66), comple ting the ve rifi cati o n of the asse rtions in section 7. In (8. 25) , it is ass ume d that tie-breakin g in the formation of E k a nd E s is pe rfo rmed so that the latte r is a s ubset of the form er ; that is, the s um in (8. 25) c ons ists of k -s largest among k smallest membe rs of {cf : i f. E}, and is equal to Sk -Ss in the notation of the preceding paragraph. 
